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This bypass was assigned CVE-2023-23530 by Apple. By using methods that had not been restricted it was possible to empty these lists, enabling all the same methods that had been available before. However, we discovered that these new mitigations could be bypassed. These mitigations used large denylist to prevent the use of certain classes and methods that could clearly jeopardize security. Since then, Apple has removed features used in this exploit and CodeColorist's blog post and added new mitigations to attempt to restrict what could be done with NSPredicate. The See No Eval post seemed to have been the main idea behind the sandbox escape used in FORCEDENTRY. CodeColorist notes at the end of his post that 'Without a proper validation, it could be an inter-process attack surface to bypass TCC.' Classes that implement this protocol can be used to check every expression to make sure they were safe to evaluate. However, the post also describes ways in which Apple has mitigated the dangerousness of these objects, namely through a protocol called NSPredicateVisitor. Using existing classes in Apple's private frameworks, it was possible to bypass pointer authentication (PAC) and every other mitigation to call any function. The gist of this research was that NSExpression objects, the building blocks of an NSPredicate, could be used to call arbitrary methods on arbitrary classes and objects.

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He subsequently gave a talk and published the blog post See No Eval in January 2021 which detailed how to use them to run arbitrary code. CodeColorist, a prolific iOS userspace security researcher, designed a challenge for Real World CTF 2019 that involved exploiting the mechanics of NSPredicate. The FORCEDENTRY Sandbox Escape was not the first exploration of this behavior. However, this was just the beginning, as this feature revealed an entirely new bug class that completely breaks inter-process security in macOS and iOS.

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The ability to dynamically generate and run code on iOS had been an official feature this whole time.

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In reality the syntax of NSPredicate is a full scripting language. It involved NSPredicate, an innocent looking class that allows developers to filter lists of arbitrary objects. While much attention was given to the first exploit, we were much more interested in the second as it described a way to dynamically execute arbitrary code in another process which completely sidestepped code signing.

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Part 1 described the initial exploitation of PDF parsing code and Part 2 laid out the sandbox escape. They further collaborated with Google Project Zero to analyze the exploits, leading to a pair of posts detailing the methods used in the attack. In September 2021 Citizen Lab revealed FORCEDENTRY, a 0-click iOS remote code execution exploit that targeted a Saudi activist in order to infect their iPhone with the Pegasus Malware. These issues could be used by malicious applications and exploits to gain access to sensitive information such as a user's messages, location data, call history, and photos.

The vulnerabilities range from medium to high severity with CVSS scores between 5.1 and 7.1. The Trellix Advanced Research Center vulnerability team has discovered a large new class of bugs that allow bypassing code signing to execute arbitrary code in the context of several platform applications, leading to escalation of privileges and sandbox escape on both macOS and iOS.

As macOS has continually adopted more features of iOS it has also come to enforce code signing more strictly. The ability to dynamically execute code was nearly completely removed, creating a powerful barrier for exploits which would need to find a way around these mitigations to run a malicious program. Only applications that were cryptographically signed by a developer certificate trusted by Apple could be executed, and scripting languages like AppleScript were not found on iOS.

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Since the first version of iOS on the original iPhone, Apple has enforced careful restrictions on the software that can run on their mobile devices. This blog was written by Austin Emmitt Introduction Trellix Advanced Research Center Discovers a New Privilege Escalation Bug Class on macOS and iOS

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